Santa Clara Law

Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2-17-2015

Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy: Is the Public
Benefit Corporation Trivial?
David Yosifon
Santa Clara University School of Law, dyosifon@scu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Law Commons
Automated Citation
David Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy: Is the Public Benefit Corporation Trivial? (2015),
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/917

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

OPTING OUT OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY:
IS THE PUBLIC BENEFIT CORPORATION TRIVIAL?

David G. Yosifon1

Draft: February 17, 2016

1

Associate Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law. Dyosifon@scu.edu. My
thanks to Mary Sexton for her expert assistance in obtaining research materials. Brit
Benjamin provided outstanding research assistance. I am grateful to Steve Diamond,
David Friedman, Deep Gulasekaram, David Sloss, Michele Oberman, and Stephen Yosifon
for comments on an earlier draft. A summer research stipend from Santa Clara University
School of Law helped support the research and writing of this Article.

OPTING OUT OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY

Abstract:
The central command of corporate governance law is that directors
must serve the shareholder interest.
Directors may not sacrifice
shareholder value in favor of other corporate stakeholders or other
interests. In this Article, I examine whether this rule of shareholder
primacy is mandatory, or merely a default rule which can be altered
through private ordering. I argue that Delaware’s corporate law, the most
important corporate law in the United States, should be understood to have
long-permitted privately-ordered deviation from shareholder primacy. This
assessment, however, is at least complicated by the recent legislative
creation of the Public Benefit Corporation (PBC). The PBC is a new form
of business organization that explicitly charges directors with balancing the
interests of shareholders and non-shareholders in corporate operations.
The PBC innovation may lead judges to conclude that if corporate
promoters want to deviate from shareholder primacy, they must do so by
using the Public Benefit Corporation. The organizational and governance
requirements of the PBC are highly particular, and most of its important
features are mandatory. My claim is that the Public Benefit Corporation
may inadvertently have narrowed flexibility in the creation of corporations
that alter the shareholder primacy norm, rather than expanded it, as the
PBC’s proponents and many commentators have presumed.
A more desirable interpretation, however, is that private-ordering of
corporate beneficiary is still permitted under the Delaware General
Corporation Law, and that the PBC is merely one alternative structure – a
non-exclusive “menu option” – which promoters seeking alternatives to
shareholder wealth maximization might find convenient to use. I urge
judges to adopt this second interpretation, and I urge Delaware lawmakers
to clarify their intentions to avoid jurists adopting the view that the PBC is
the exclusive path to multi-stakeholder governance.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The central command of corporate governance law is that directors must
serve the shareholder interest.2 Directors may not sacrifice shareholder
value in favor of other corporate stakeholders or other interests. In this
Article, I examine whether this rule of shareholder primacy is mandatory, or
merely a default rule which can be altered through private ordering. I argue
that Delaware’s corporate law, the most important corporate law in the
United States, should be understood to have long-permitted privatelyordered deviation from shareholder primacy.3 This assessment, however, is
at least complicated by the recent legislative creation of the Public Benefit
Corporation (PBC). The PBC is a new form of business organization that
explicitly charges directors with balancing the interests of shareholders and
non-shareholders in corporate operations. The PBC innovation may lead
judges to conclude that if corporate promoters want to deviate from
shareholder primacy, they must do so by using the Public Benefit
Corporation. The organizational and governance requirements of the PBC
are highly particular, and most of its important features are mandatory. My
claim is that the Public Benefit Corporation may inadvertently have
narrowed flexibility in the creation of corporations that alter the shareholder
primacy norm, rather than expanded it, as the PBC’s proponents and many
commentators have presumed.4
A more desirable interpretation, however, is that private-ordering of
corporate beneficiary is still permitted under the Delaware General
Corporation Law, and that the PBC is merely one alternative structure – a
non-exclusive “menu option” – which promoters seeking alternatives to
shareholder wealth maximization might find convenient to use. I urge

2

See David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 181
(2013) (demonstrating that the law of Delaware really is shareholder primacy, and
critiquing the arguments of scholars who doubt this).
But see LYNN STOUT, THE
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH (2012) (insisting that shareholder primacy is not the law).
3
Corporate law scholarship lamentably uses the phrase “shareholder primacy” in two
distinct senses. Sometimes the phrase is used to describe the goal of corporate governance
(i.e., firms should serve the shareholder interest), but other times it is used to describe the
means of corporate governance (i.e., shareholders should have a significant say in how
firms are run). I think the phrase should be used exclusively to refer to the goal of
corporate governance, and that is the only sense in which I use the phrase in this article.
4
See, e.g., J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit
Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345 (2014).
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judges to adopt this second interpretation, and I urge Delaware lawmakers
to clarify their intentions to avoid jurists adopting the view that the PBC is
the exclusive path to multi-stakeholder governance.
The issue of whether and how corporate purpose can be altered is likely
to soon emerge in important areas of social contest. First, there appears to
be a real desire among some entrepreneurs, investors, workers, and
consumers to make use of hybrid forms that fall between the polar extremes
of profit-maximizing firms and non-profit ones. Such adventurers want to
know what is possible and want is forbidden in the design of alternative
entities. Uncertainty will impede broad experimentation, and, where
experimentation is undertaken in the face of such uncertainty, costly and
disruptive litigation will lurk, and strike.
Ambiguity in this area is likely to trouble small-scale, under-lawyered
socially conscious ventures, and it may also bedevil some behemoths.
When Facebook, Inc., first went public in 2012, the Registration Statement
it filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission included a “Letter
from Mark Zuckerberg,” the company founder, and (then) 27-year old Chair
of Facebook’s Board of Directors. The letter reads as a warning that
Facebook has a “mission” that is not limited to serving the shareholders:
Facebook was not originally created to be a company. It was built
to accomplish a social mission — to make the world more open
and connected. We think it’s important that everyone who invests
in Facebook understands what this mission means to us, how we
make decisions and why we do the things we do.
...
Simply put: we don’t build services to make money; we make
money to build better services. . . . These days I think more and
more people want to use services from companies that believe in
something beyond simply maximizing profits.5

If this is not just puffery, Zuckerberg and his appointees may be
confused about their legal obligations, or may at least be confusing their
investors and the public about it.6 Suppose two companies, say Apple and

5

See
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000119312512034517/d287954ds1.htm#
toc287954_10 (hereinafter, “Facebook Registration Statement”).
6
Facebook went public with a dual class structure in which Zuckerberg retained a
dominate share of voting stock, while the public was offered non-voting stock. Some
analysts suggest that Facebook shareholders have essentially agreed to go along with
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The Circle,7 undertook a bidding war for Facebook, and Zuckerberg
privileged a lower Apple bid because he believed Apple would make great
products with Facebook’s assets, unlike The Circle, which he thought
would just focus on profits. Has Zuckerberg violated his fiduciary
obligation to Facebook’s shareholders? Of course he has. Facebook is a
Delaware corporation, and the fiduciary obligations of Delaware directors
cannot be altered through letters in registration statements.8 But this Article
suggests that Zuckerberg, and corporate promotors who share the idea of
putting the social mission of a business before (or alongside) profits, could
have operationalized this mission through a Delaware corporation, and still
can, without having to make use of the highly restrictive Public Benefit
Corporation form.
Collateral areas of social policy are also newly attentive to the question
of corporate purpose. For example, in the controversial 2014 case of
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,9 the United States Supreme Court held that under
the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Hobby Lobby
corporation was entitled to an exemption from certain commands of the
America Cares Act, because the statute substantially burdened the firm’s
sincerely held religious beliefs.10 The government had argued that Hobby
Lobby could not hold religious beliefs, because it was a business
corporation whose sole lawful purpose was to make money for
shareholders. The Supreme Court, however, credited board resolutions and
public statements of the firm as evidence of its religiosity. Hobby Lobby is
a closely held family corporation, and none of its shareholders objected to
Zuckerberg’s ride, wherever he chooses to go. But as a legal matter the fact that
Facebook’s shareholders have no voice in corporate governance would make it even more
important to impose strict fiduciary obligations on the directors, since shareholders cannot
protect themselves through corporate democracy.
7
In his dystopian novel, THE CIRCLE (2014), Dave Eggers imagines the emergence of a
corporation that dwarfs the combined influence of Google, Facebook, Apple, and Amazon.
It maintains Facebook’s databases, purchased for billions of dollars, as a deep archive of its
users’ personal histories and predilections. Id.
8
And make no mistake, the hypothetical here is posed as a “last period” problem only to
starkly express the issue. If Facebook is forbidden from sacrificing profits in the public
interest when selling the company, it is just as surely forbidden from doing so in the
ordinary course of business (although it may, of course, conclude that operational restraint
in the short-term is better for the shareholders in the long-term). See Yosifon, The Law of
Corporate Purpose, supra note __ at 219-223 (clarifying that while under Delaware law
directors of going-concerns enjoy total discretion to determine what is the most profitable
time horizon in which to maximize returns to shareholders, they have no discretion at all
regarding whether or not to pursue the most profitable course).
9
134 S. CT. 2751 (2014).
10
134 S. CT. 2751 (2014).
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the board’s claims. But what would have been the result if a shareholder
had objected, given the absence of religious specification in the corporate
charter? The issue was dodged in Hobby Lobby, but in other similar cases
the question of whether and how a firm can opt-out of shareholder primacy
will surely become central.
These kinds of questions are likely to come up, as firms struggle with
how to structure non-standard organizations, and governments struggle with
how to regulate them. The world has a funny way of presenting facts that
the law is least able to deal with in simple deductive fashion. After
developing my arguments about the relationship between ordinary corporate
law and public benefit corporations, I call for and suggest paths towards
judicial and legislative clarification, as well as broader reforms.11
II. ALTERING THE SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY DEFAULT RULE
Front-Loading a Private-Ordering Anti-Climax
Regardless of whether privately-ordered, idiosyncratic deviation from
shareholder primacy can be achieved through the Delaware General
Corporation Law, it could surely be accomplished through the use of a
Limited Liability Company (LLC) statute.12 Delaware’s LLC law explicitly

11

See infra Section IV. In the course of this assessment, I make use of and contribute to
longstanding doctrinal and normative debates about the desirability of mandatory or
mutable rules in corporate law. See e.g., Bernard Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A
Political and Economic Analysis, 85 NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 542 (1990); Henry N.
Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the AntiContractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990); Jeffery N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure
of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549 (1989); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure
of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (1989); Roberto Romano, Answering the
Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
(1989). Those debates, prominent in the late-1980’s and early-1990s, did not address the
question of corporate beneficiary. This literature has in recent years been advanced by
newfound attention to “altering rules,” that is, the rules that govern not whether, but how a
rule can be altered, and how altering rules can be most desirably designed. See generally,
Ian Ayers, Regulating Opt-Out, 121 YALE L. J. 2032 (2012) (emphasizing the emerging
scholarly and policymaking focus on “altering rules,” the rules that regulate how to deviate
from default rules); see also Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in
Corporate Law, 50 SMU L. REV. 383 (2007) (examining altering rules in the corporate
context, but not addressing issue of corporate purpose). I situate my inquiry about private
ordering of corporate purpose within that bourgeoning literature.
12
Prior even to using a “business organization,” nothing would stop a person from running
a sole proprietorship in a manner that balanced numerous aims, say, profitability and
environmental stewardship. Entrepreneurs, however, want to do business through a legal
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embraces maximum mutability, stating: “It is the policy of this chapter to
give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the
enforceability of limited liability company agreements.”13 This maximum
freedom provision is not found in Delaware’s General Corporation Law, or
in the new PBC statute.14 Because of the “maximum flexibility” of the LLC
statute, it is appropriate, in a sense, to conceive of the Limited Liability
Company as the foundational business entity, with the more restrictive
corporate form (it is undoubtedly more restrictive in some ways)15
construed as a sub-species of the LLC, one that provides specific terms that
many investors find desirable.16

entity in order to exploit advantages that legal forms provide, including most importantly,
limited liability to the entrepreneur for the debts of the business (in both contract and tort),
and affirmative asset segregation, insulating the assets of the business from the reach of an
owner’s personal creditors. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role
of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L. REV. 387 (2000). See also generally Ann E.
Conaway, The Global Use of the Delaware Limited Liability Company for Socially-Driven
Purposes, 38 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV. 772, 780 (2012) (“The Delaware LLC offers
contractual freedom to investors, managers, owners, funds, and foundations to structure a
for-benefit, for-profit socially responsible business plan with limited liability for owners
and investors . . . due to its completely mobile, contractual character.”).
13
8 DEL. C. § 18-1101.
14
The LLC statute further provides that “to the extent that . . . at law or in equity . . . [a]
person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited liability company . . . [the]
person’s duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the limited
liability company agreement.” 8 DEL. C. § 18-1101. The LLC statute does state that LLC
agreements “may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.” Id. The Delaware Court of Chancery has also held that on public policy grounds
it will not enforce LLC provisions disclaiming liability for fraudulent misrepresentations
where the representations are knowingly falsely made. But these limitation must surely be
trivial, in that vanishingly few business-people would seek to contract to such provision. In
CML, LLC v. Bax, 28 A.3d 1037, 1043 (Del. 2011) the Delaware Supreme Court held that
the LLC statute limits derivative suits to “members” of the LLC, and that creditors did not
therefore having standing to bring suit on the LLC’s behalf even where the LLC was
insolvent, even though creditors of insolvent corporations do have standing to bring
derivative suits. See infra text accompanying notes __-__ . The Court’s discussion in
CML suggests that the standing limitation could not be muted by contract. However, the
LLC statute stipulates that the LLC agreement may designate “members” who have no
equity interest in the LLC.
15
See infra text accompanying notes __-__.
16
For example, if a promoter wanted to form a business that was governed by all aspects of
Delaware corporate law except that she wanted to opt-out of duty of loyalty liability for
LLC managers, as is permitted under the LLC statute but forbidden under the Delaware
corporate code, then the promoter could form an LLC with an operating agreement stating
that the LLC would be governed by the standards set forth in the Delaware corporate code
and case law interpreting it, except for the corporate code’s prohibition on eliminating duty
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The freedom available in the LLC form makes inquiry into the
mutability of shareholder primacy in corporate governance a trivial pursuit,
in a technical sense. 17 But only in a technical sense. Mutability within the
Delaware General Corporation Law matters a great deal as a matter of
custom, culture, and practice. Investors prefer the stability and reliability of
the Delaware corporation, as compared to the still relatively new LLC.18
Many small firms start out as LLC’s, but before they can attract backing
from venture capital, and almost certainly before they go public, lawyers
and business people will usually insist on re-forming as a corporation. And
more often than not, they will insist on a Delaware corporation. The
question we are pursuing, therefore, is whether deviation from shareholder

of loyalty liability. Cf. Bob Dylan, Highway 61 Revisited, on HIGHWAY 61 REVISITED
(Columbia Records 1965) (“He found a promoter who nearly fell off the floor / He said, ‘I
never engaged in this kind of thing before / But yes I think it can be very easily done.’”).
17
This was understood but not emphasized in the seminal debates twenty-five years ago on
the “triviality” of corporate law, perhaps because the LLC was only just emerging at that
time as an important form of business organization. The LLC was invented in the 1977 in
Wyoming, but its use was not widespread before the 1990’s. See 17 WY. ST. § 15.
Delaware did not adopt an LLC statute until 1991. See 6 DEL. C. § 18. See Black, Is
Corporate Law Trivial?, supra note __ at 557 (“We can imagine a continuum of avoidance
costs, from the low cost extreme of opting out of a default rule, through the relatively low
cost strategy of re-incorporating, the higher cost strategy of altering a company's capital
structure, and at the high cost extreme, choosing a different form of enterprise organization.
At some point, the cost of avoiding a rule is large enough so that we can’t call the rule
trivial.”); see also Butler & Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties, supra note __ at 11
(“[T]he parties to a firm can opt out of terms that are mandatory for all corporations simply
by choosing among different investment and organizational forms. For example, the
“mandatory” requirement of at least majority shareholder voting on significant corporate
transactions can be avoided by disincorporating into a limited partnership. See also
McDonnell, Sticky Defaults, supra note __ (arguing that it is best to conceive of corporate
law rules along a continuum from easy to alter (what he calls “Teflon” rules) to very hard
to alter, but that it is imprecise to think of rules as being ultimately mandatory; indeed,
even if no form permits what you want to do you can always petition the government for a
change).
18
See e.g., William J. Carney, et. al., Lawyers, Ignorance, and the Dominance of Delaware
Corporate Law, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 123, 125 (2012) (“Even if other states’ laws are
superior, investors prefer incorporation in familiar Delaware.”); Alan R. Palmiter, Toward
Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 121 (1999) (“By
many accounts, Delaware’s prominence is rooted in its ability to provide a corporate
environment that investors most prefer. Managers who choose Delaware are rewarded by
investors; those who choose less investor-friendly states are punished.”). Cf. Black, Is
Corporate Law Trivial?, supra note __ at 545. (“[S]ince 1966, Pennsylvania has allowed
companies to adopt by charter any corporate governance provision whatsoever, whether or
not contrary to Pennsylvania law”)(citing 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1306(a)8(ii)). Yet
Pennsylvania is home to few non-domestic corporations.
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primacy in corporate governance can be established within the friendly,
familiar confines of the Delaware General Corporation Law.
Private Ordering in the Delaware General Corporation Law
The academic literature contains many scattered, undeveloped assertions
that shareholder primacy is merely a default rule of corporate governance
that can be muted by private ordering. In their landmark study, The
Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel
Fischel took the mutability of shareholder primacy as a given:
[W]hat is the goal of the corporation? Is it profit, and for whom?
Social welfare more broadly defined? . . . Our response to such
questions is: who cares? If the New York Times is formed to
publish a newspaper first and make a profit second, no one should
be allowed to object. Those who came in at the beginning
consented, and those who came later bought stock the price of
which reflected the corporation’s tempered commitment to a profit
objective. . . . Corporate ventures may select their preferred
“constituencies.” The role of corporate law here, as elsewhere, is
to adopt a background term that prevails unless varied by
contract.19

A more recent article by Jonathan Macey makes the same assumption,
practically as an aside: “because the corporation is a contract-based form of
business organization, maximizing shareholder gain is only a default rule.
Shareholders could opt out of this goal if they so desired.”20 Later in the
same article, Macey states: “These are the default rules in corporate law
[i.e., shareholder primacy], subject to modification by the various
participants in the corporate enterprise, of course.”21 Scholars typically
give no citation for these kinds of statements, they are instead derivations,
or postulates really, of the view that the corporation is a “nexus-ofcontracts,” and corporate law merely a standard form contract that parties
can take or tailor as they like.
The American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance,
developed in the late-1980s and early-1990s, ducked the question of muting
corporate beneficiary, averring that the Principles “do[] not address the
19

Frank H. Easterbook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law,
35-36 (1991).
20
Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA.
L. & BUS. REV. 177, 179 (2008).
21
Macey, supra note __ at 189 (emphasis added).
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question, under what circumstances may a corporation that is organized
under a business corporation law restrict the general profit-making objective
. . . by a certificate provision.”22 A Comment in the Principles hedges:
“[s]tatutory provisions governing the amendment of the certificate of
incorporation are very open-ended on their face, but may nevertheless be
subject to various express or implied restrictions.”23 However, the Chief
Reporter of the Principles, Melvin Eisenberg, included a Reporter’s Note to
the Comment, where he reflected that: “[b]ecause the [profitmaking]
obligations . . . run to the shareholders, rather than to third parties or the
state, there is little doubt that such limitations [on profitmaking] would
normally be permissible if agreed to by all the shareholders.”24 Eisenberg’s
Note, like the Principles themselves, operate at too general a level to
provide precise guidance on the question of mutability in Delaware, or
anywhere else. It is impossible to answer hard corporate law questions
without answering them about a specific body of corporate law, rather than
“corporate law” generally.
The Delaware General Corporation Law contains many clearly
mandatory elements, as well as many explicitly mutable ones. For example,
firms are free to set the term of years that directors serve upon election to
the board, but the term may not be set at more than three years.25 The
charter may exculpate directors from liability for violations of the duty of
care, but not the duty of loyalty.26 Delaware’s statute is usually clear about
which of its explicit provisions are mandatory, and which are mutable.
Where adumbrating mandatory provisions, the statute uses phrases like
“every corporation shall,” and when describing default provisions it states

22

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01.
23
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §2.01, Comment D.
24
Eisenberg was a central figure in the “triviality” debates of the late-1980s and 1990s.
See Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, supra note __. Ann Conaway appears to
argue that a corporation could create, through language in the charter, “contractual,” but
not “fiduciary” duties running to non-shareholders, since to her the corporation is a contract
between the state, the stockholders, and the corporation. See Anne E. Conaway, Lessons to
Be Learned: How the Policy of Freedom to Contract in Delaware’s Alternative Entity Law
Might Inform Delaware’s General Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789,793-794 & n.
15 (2008). But that begs the crucial questions: first, why isn’t the corporate contract a
contract among all of the firm’s stakeholders, and, second, can the contract that Conaway
envisions permissibly be undertaken for purposes other than advancing shareholder
interests? These are the questions that I am trying to answer in this Article.
25
8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. §141(d).
26
8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. §102(b)(7). See also infra text accompanying notes __-__
(discussing the genesis of this exculpation provision).
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“unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation.”27 However,
strange as it may (rightly) seem to those unfamiliar with this area of law, the
issue of corporate beneficiary is not directly addressed in Delaware’s
corporate law statute.28 The black letter law on this crucial matter has
instead been supplied by case law, clearly specifies that shareholder
primacy is (at least) the default rule under Delaware law.29 Nonshareholder interests can be taken into account, but only when doing so is
“rationally related” to serving the shareholders.30
This rule of shareholder primacy is stated in a number of Delaware
cases, the most recent and explicit of which is eBay v. Newmark.31 A
founder of Craigslist, Inc., the popular online “classifieds” website, sold his
stake in the company to eBay, Inc. Later, eBay complained that the
remaining founders were pursuing designs to entrench themselves in control
of Craigslist, in order to ensure that the company would continue to operate
as a kind of community service, and not be forced to focus only on
shareholders. The founders frankly acknowledged this motive. Chancellor
William Chandler made clear that such a motive was impermissible:
Jim and Craig opted to form craigslist, Inc. as a for-profit
Delaware corporation . . . . Having chosen a for-profit corporate
27

See Gordon, supra note __ at 1553 & n. 16 (“[T]he phrase ‘unless otherwise provided in
the certificate of incorporation,’ runs through the famously flexible Delaware code like a
leitmotif. Nevertheless, many features of corporate law, great and small, are mandatory.”).
28
Compare the situation in Delaware to that in California, where the statute is clear: “A
director shall perform the duties of a director . . . in good faith, in a manner such director
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.” CALIFORNIA
CORPORATIONS CODE § 309(a).
29
See generally Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, supra note __. The urgency of
the question of mutability of corporate purpose only emerges after one understands that
shareholder primacy is in fact the prevailing law. If one assumes that directors presently
have latitude with respect to whether or not to put shareholder interests first, then the
question of muting away from shareholder primacy is moot. See Lyman Johnson,
Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV.
269, 271-72 (2013) (criticizing proponents of benefit corporations for “misunderstanding
that traditional for-profit corporations (like LLCs) are legally free to pursue social or
environmental goals and except in limited circumstances in Delaware most notably, are not
required to maximize corporate profits and/or shareholder wealth.”).
30
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrew & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1985)
(“A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities,
provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.”).
31
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010). The cases
that speak directly to the issue of corporate beneficiary all pre-date the creation of the
Delaware Public Benefit Corporation, and so we do not have any teaching about the
relationship between the two statutes.
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form, the craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and
standards that accompany that form. Those standards include
acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its
stockholders. The “Inc.” after the company name has to mean at
least that. Thus, I cannot accept as valid for the purposes of
implementing the Rights Plan a corporate policy that specifically,
clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value
of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its
stockholders.32

In eBay, Chancellor Chandler thus made clear both that shareholder
primacy is the law and that corporate “persona,” public statements, routine
self-descriptions, and board policies were not sufficient to alter the default
rule of shareholder primacy.33 However, neither eBay, nor other cases
expressing Delaware’s shareholder primacy norm, however, makes clear
whether the rule is mandatory or alterable, and if alterable, how to alter it.34
While the Delaware statute does not supply the shareholder primacy
norm, it does provide multiple open-ended invitations to private-ordering.
The broadest opportunity comes in Section 102, which describes necessary
and permissive elements of the “certificate of incorporation.” Section
102(a)(3) says the certificate “shall set forth … [t]he nature of the business
or purposes to be conducted or promoted.”35 It continues: “[it] shall be

32

eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010).
It should be clear, therefore, that it will not be sufficient for a corporation operating
under the default rules in Delaware to point to corporate persona, marketing materials, or
statements from the board to establish that the corporation has, say, a sincerely held
religious belief that would excuse it from complying with laws of general application under
RFRA, unless the directors can also claim in good faith that they believed adherence to
religious beliefs was the surest path to profits for the shareholders. See supra text
accompanying notes __-__ (discussing Hobby Lobby). Even if the Supreme Court were
willing to credit non-charter statements for purposes of extending RFRA’s protections, if
such statements confessed a commitment to sacrifice profits in service of religious
believes, then the directors would have to answer for it in Delaware.
34
Ian Ayers argues that when discussing legal rules judges should specify whether they
consider the rules to be mandatory or mutable. It they conclude in a case before them that
the parties have not effectively altered a mutable rule, the judge should specify how the
parties might have done it. This would give guidance to future parties, and it would also
force the hand of the legislature if it desires some mode of alteration other than that
suggested by judicial dicta. See Ayers, Regulating Opt-Out, supra note __ at 2055-2059.
Cf. David A. Wishnick, Corporate Purposes in a Free Enterprise System: A Comment on
eBay v. Newark, 121 Yale L. J. 2405, 2410-2411 (2012) (incorrectly interpreting
Chancellor Chandler’s verbiage in eBay as expressing the view that shareholder primacy in
corporate governance is immutable).
35
8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 102(a)(3).
33
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sufficient to state, either alone or with other businesses or purposes, that the
purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity for
which corporations may be organized under the General Corporation Law
of Delaware.”36 Here would seem to be the place where promoters could
specify that their firm will be governed by a multi-stakeholder governance
regime, rather than the default rule of shareholder primacy. But this begs
the question: is multiple-stakeholder governance a “lawful act or activity for
which corporations may be organized under the General Corporation Law
of Delaware” or not? I will return to that question below.37
Interpretation of the scope of private ordering available under section
102(a)(3) is complicated and confused by the section’s history, and the
general history of corporate law statutes. In the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, states granted corporate charters only by specific legislative
action, for particular undertakings or “purposes,” such as the organization
of a railroad, or the building of a canal. In the early twentieth century,
states adopted “general” incorporation statutes, which made corporate
charters available by routine administrative action to all comers. The
general incorporation statutes still required corporate promoters to specify
the purpose or type of business their corporation would undertake. In this
stage of the evolution of corporate law, however, the stipulation of
“purpose” in the charter became less a limitation on corporate power
imposed by a jealous state, and more a protection afforded to corporate
investors, who were thought to be entitled to some certainty about the kind
of business they were investing in. Corporate acts that went beyond the
corporate purpose specified in the charter were “ultra vires,” void (or later,
voidable), and could be enjoined by shareholders or the government. Soon
enough it became evident, however, that what investors really wanted was
for their firms to enter whatever fields of endeavor might prove profitable.
Promoters therefore started stuffing long lists of permissible purposes into
corporate charters, which could reach cumbersome and absurd lengths.
Solicitous legislatures responded by reforming general incorporation
statutes to allow firms to specify that their purpose was to undertake “any
lawful act or activity.”38

36

8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 102(a)(3).
See infra text accompanying notes __-__.
38
See David G. Yosifon, Corporate Aid of Governmental Authority: History and Analysis
of an Obscure Power in Delaware Corporate Law, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1086 (2013)
(distinguishing between corporate purposes, corporate powers, and corporate
beneficiaries).
37
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Most Delaware business corporations are today in fact formed with the
catch-all purpose of engaging in “any lawful act or activity.” But this is
never taken to establish a deviation from the shareholder primacy norm, or
to express an expansion of the default beneficiary to include, say, any
beneficiary that could be lawfully served by a corporation. Rather, the
provision is supplied in order to give directors the greatest possible
discretion in selecting means to serve the default beneficiary. Indeed,
Craigslist’s certificate of incorporation stated that its purpose was to
“engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations may be
organized under the General Corporation Law of Delaware.”39 Yet this
expansive language played no role whatsoever in Chancellor Chandler’s
disquisition on the law of corporate purpose in the eBay case.
Still, it seems plausible to conjecture that section 102(a)’s invitation to
state the corporation’s “purpose” could be used to specify a change in
beneficiary, which by default is the shareholders.40 While it would require
a somewhat twisted construction of the statutory language, we could
understand (or encourage courts to understand) the broad “any lawful act”
language to incorporate the default beneficiary of corporate operations – the
shareholders – and to express that the firm may do any business in service
of that end. However, explicit specification of a purpose to serve multiplestakeholders, or to otherwise deviate from the shareholder primacy default
could be achieved by stipulation through section 102(a) making that clear.
And then, of course, the charter could further specify that “any lawful act”
(any kind of business activity) may be undertaken to serve that privately
ordered beneficiary or corporate goal.41

39

Certificate of Incorporation of Craigslist, Inc., October 13, 2004. On file with author.
See infra text accompanying notes __-__ (discussing the use of the “purpose” provision
in Delaware non-profit corporations).
41
Many different approaches to private ordering of corporate beneficiary could be
imagined. For example, a charter might call upon directors to “balance” the interests of
multiple-stakeholders, including shareholders, workers, and consumers. The charter might
also specify how the duties it establishes are to be enforced. The default rule in Delaware is
that only shareholders have standing to bring derivative claims while the firm is solvent,
and the creditors have standing to bring such claims where the firm is insolvent. See
Quadrant Structured Products Co., Ltd. v. Vertin (2014), 102 A.3d 155 (2014) (Laster,
Vice Chancellor). If a charter explicitly indicated that the parties considered workers or
consumers to be owed fiduciary duties, then the courts might be willing to recognize
consumers as having standing.
40
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Drawing Insight From Non-Profit Corporate Law
Many states have separate “for profit” and “non-profit” corporation
statutes.
Delaware does not.
Both “for profit” and “non-profit”
corporations are formed under the Delaware General Corporation Law. The
way that a Delaware non-profit is formed is instructive on the question of
whether the shareholder primacy norm in Delaware corporate law is subject
to private ordering.
The statute does not directly specify how a “non-profit” corporation is
created. Section 102(a)(4) contemplates the formation of corporations that
are not authorized to issue stock, and that section states that a non-stock
corporation “shall” state the “non-stock” limitation in its charter, and
“shall” state the “conditions of membership of the corporation,” in their
charter.42 Crucially however, for present purposes, there is no requirement
that “non-stock” corporations be “non-profit” corporations, and for-profit
non-stock corporations are apparently routinely created as special purpose
vehicles in complex business settings.43 Therefore, something more than
status as a “non-stock” corporation is required to make a firm a non-profit
corporation in Delaware. There is no “for-profit”/“non-profit” binary
evident or implied in the architecture of the Delaware code.44
As if in response to the lack of clarity in the statute on how to form a
non-profit corporation, the Delaware Division of Corporations maintains a
form on its website for those who wish to form non-profit, exempt
organizations.45 The form prompts the user to add the verbiage “[t]his
Corporation shall be a nonprofit corporation” in the purpose section of the
charter, and it instructs the user to place that language after the phrase,

42

The charter may specify that membership conditions are to be provided in the
corporation’s bylaws. See 8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. §102(a)(4)
43
A series of 2010 amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law did provide
some clarification on the application of the statute to non-stock corporations. But the 2010
amendments have no guidance to offer with respect to the issues under review here. See
John Mark Zeberkiewicz & Black Rohrbacher, New Day for Nonstock Corporations: The
2010 Amendments to Delaware’s General Corporation Law, 66 BUSINESS LAWYER 271
(2010).
44
When it comes to establishing the fees that corporations must pay for their Delaware
chartering privileges, the General Corporation Law does squarely distinguish between forprofit and non-profit corporations. Section 391(j), for example, provides special corporate
franchise tax treatment for “exempt” organizations, and it essentially uses federal standards
for establishing tax-exempt status under 26 U.S.C. 501(c), to determine whether firms are
“exempt” for the purpose of state franchise taxes. See 8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 391(j).
45
On file with author, available at https://corp.delaware.gov/Inc_Exempt.pdf
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“[t]he purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful act of [sic]
activity for which corporations may be organized under the General
Corporation Law of Delaware.”46 This procedure is not established by
statute, but it roughly tracks what I have suggested is the path to any kind of
private-ordering of corporate beneficiary under the Delaware statute.
The fiduciary law applicable to Delaware non-profits is underdeveloped,
both in case law and in scholarship.47 But the Delaware Supreme Court has
had no difficulty locating the other-than-profit-maximizing goals of
charitable corporations with reference to the private ordering specified in
the charter. In a prominent (for other reasons) case called Oberly v. Kirby,48
the Delaware Supreme Court stated:
because the Foundation was created for a limited charitable
purpose rather than a generalized business purpose, those who
control it have a special duty to advance its charitable goals and
protect its assets. Any action that poses a palpable and identifiable
threat to those goals, or that jeopardizes its assets would be
contrary to the Certificate and hence ultra vires.49

More recently, Vice-Chancellor Glasscock had occasion to expound on the
fiduciary duties of the directors of non-profit corporations. In Gassis v.
Corkery, he wrote: “[Oberly] made clear that a nonprofit charitable
corporation’s board owes fiduciary duties to its beneficiaries, not to its
members qua members or directors qua directors.”50 He concluded:
“nothing in the record indicates that the charitable interests of the
Defendants [i.e., decisions made by the board] are incompatible with the
aims of the Fund as stated in its Certificate of Incorporation.”51
This states it clearly. The goals of the charity are established in the
certificate, and those goals describe and limit the responsibilities of the
board, which is not otherwise distinguishable, in essence, from an ordinary
(default) board of a general business corporation. The indubitable
implication of the fact that non-profit corporations are subsumed within the
46

On file with author, available at https://corp.delaware.gov/Inc_Exempt.pdf
See Mary A. Jacobson, Nonprofit Corporations: Conversion to For-Profit Corporate
Status and Nonprofit Corporation Members Rights – Farahpour v. DCX., 20 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 635 (1995).
48
Oberly v. Kirby, 492 A.2d 445 (Del. Supr. Ct. 1991).
49
Oberly v. Kirby, 492 A.2d 445, 462 (Del. 1991) (first emphasis added).
50
Gassis v. Corkery, No. CIV.A. 8868-VCG, 2014 WL 2200319, at *14 (Del. Ch. May 28,
2014) aff'd, 113 A.3d 1080 (Del. 2015)
51
Gassis v. Corkery, supra note __ at *15 (emphasis added).
47
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Delaware General Corporation Law is that the beneficiary of Delaware
corporate governance is subject to private ordering. The legal architecture
here makes two points about Delaware law clear: first, the default rule is
profit-maximization, and second, promoters can deviate from that default if
they so desire.
Consistency with the Laws of Delaware
The search for permissible private-ordering of corporate beneficiary
may fruitfully be continued in section 102(b) of the Delaware corporate
code, which states that in addition to required information, the certificate
“may also contain . . . [a]ny provision for the management of the business
and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation . . . if such provisions
are not contrary to the laws of this State.”52 This nod to private-ordering
may be as good a place to express deviation from the shareholder primacy
norm as is section 102(a), but its import is again obscured by the questionbegging language: “if such provisions are not contrary to the laws of this
State.”53 This limitation echoes section 102(a)’s invitation to place in the
charter any purpose “for which a corporation may be organized under the
laws of Delaware,”54 and the two restrictions may properly be read as coextensive for present purposes. We must ask whether a governance
provision under section 102(b) altering the shareholder primacy norm in
corporate governance, a rule established not by statute but by common law,
would be “contrary to the laws” of Delaware.
In Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel, decided in 1952, the Delaware Supreme
Court concluded that “the laws of this State” referenced in the cognate rule
of the then-existing Delaware corporate code, sometimes, but not always,
includes the common law.55 Sterling concerned a merger between the
Hilton Corporation and the Mayflower Hotel. Prior to the merger, Hilton
owned a controlling stake in Mayflower, and Hilton’s representatives
dominated Mayflower’s board. Some minority Mayflower shareholders
objected to the merger and asserted that the Mayflower board’s approval of
the deal was invalid, because the board had counted interested Hiltonrepresentatives on the Mayflower board towards establishing a quorum, in
violation of Delaware case law, which stated that interested directors could
not be counted towards a quorum for votes involving interested
52

8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 102(b)(3).
8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L § 102(b)(3).
54
8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. §102(a). See supra text accompanying notes __-__ (discussing
this section).
55
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 117 (1952).
53
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transactions.56 Mayflower’s certificate of incorporation contained a
provision specifying that interested directors could count towards a quorum,
but the plaintiff shareholders argued that this charter provision was invalid,
since it was “contrary to the laws” of Delaware, as expressed in the
common law.
The Sterling Court rejected the idea that corporations are precluded
from modifying “any rule of the common law relating to the regulation of
the corporate enterprise,” because “[s]uch a construction unwarrantably
narrows the scope of the enabling portion of the paragraph.”57 The Court
allowed the charter provision counting interested directors towards a
quorum to stand. Before doing so, however, the Court instructed that the
common law sometimes will count as “law” that charter provisions cannot
contravene:
[It] it is clear that the scope of the proviso is broader than the field
of statutory law. . . .We do not attempt a definition; but we say that
the stockholders of a Delaware corporation may by contract
embody in the charter a provision departing from the rules of the
common law, provided that it does not transgress a statutory
enactment or a public policy settled by the common law or
implicit in the General Corporation Law itself.58

56

Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 117 (1952).
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 117 (1952) (emphasis added).
58
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 313-14, 93 A.2d 107, 118 (1952)
(“In Greene v. E. H. Rollins & Sons, Inc. . . . a charter provision was found to contain
unreasonable restraints on alienation of shares of stock and was held invalid.). The Court
also discussed and held inapposite a case the plaintiffs had cited called, State ex rel.
Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 4 W. W. HARR. 81, 34 DEL. 81, 143 A. 257 (1926), in
which a charter provision denying stockholders their common law right to inspect
corporate books was held invalid. The Sterling Court read the Penn-Beaver Oil decision as
“draw[ing] a distinction between regulation and prohibition of the common law rights of
stockholders.” The Sterling Court acknowledged that “there is also language” in the Penn
Beaver cases “suggesting that a right given by the common law may not be abrogated” to
which the Sterling Court said, “if the opinion is read as announcing the broad rule
contended for by plaintiffs we cannot agree with it.” Id.
In 1967 the Delaware legislature amended Section 144 to specify that “[c]ommon or
interested directors may be counted in determining the presence of a quorum at a meeting
of the board of directors or of a committee which authorizes the contract or transaction.”
This essentially flipped the default rule. The verbiage in §144(b) is somewhat weird, why
does it say that interested directors “may” be counted towards a quorum. What does it
depend on? Since Section 144(b) does not state “unless otherwise provided in the articles
of incorporation,” we now have to ask whether it is permissible for firms to specify in their
articles that interested directors may not count towards a quorum. Ernest Folk, III, who
57
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It seems to me that nothing is no public policy clearly indicated in the
common law establishing shareholder primacy as the corporate governance
norm that would suggest that it should be unalterable by charter provision.59
Neither does there seem to be a clearly implied policy of the General
Corporation Law to prohibit alteration of the shareholder primacy norm in
firm governance, at least not until recently. However, the Public Benefit
Corporation statute is literally a part of the General Corporation Law: it is
organized as Subchapter 15 of Title 7, which in the Delaware Code is the
General Corporation Law.60 It might be argued that the presence of the
public benefit corporation form within the corporate code implies that the
policy of the General Corporation Law is to offer the Public Benefit
Corporation, rather than open-ended private ordering, as the sole alternative
to shareholder primacy in corporate governance.61
Let us turn now to consideration of the Public Benefit Corporation and
its relationship to the overarching General Corporation Law.
III.

PRIVATE-ORDERING AND PUBLIC BENEFIT CORPORATIONS
The Public Benefit Corporation Statute

In 2013, in response to activist pressure and a wave of similar
legislation in other states, Delaware amended its corporate law to provide
for the creation of Public Benefit Corporations. According to the Delaware
was the principle architect of Delaware’s sweeping 1967 reforms, wrote in his 1972 treatise
reflecting on and interpreting those reforms: “The effect of §144(b) is to adopt as a rule of
law, presumably subject to charter variation, the doctrine of the Sterling case approving
the frequent Delaware practice of permitting interested directors to count towards a
quorum.” ERNEST FOLK, III, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW: A
COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 89 (1972) (emphasis added). Perhaps the “may” in the
statutory formulation invites that interpretation.
59
Operating from the mistaken view that corporate law presently permits directors to
sacrifice shareholder interests on behalf of non-shareholders, Einer Elhague considers
whether it would be permissible to include a charter provision eliminating such discretion,
and insisting on shareholder primacy. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in
the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733 (2005). He concludes that such a provision
would be against public policy, in part, because he thinks it would require abrogation of the
business judgment rule, which would be too onerous for the courts to manage. Id. This is
wrong on every level. First, shareholder primacy is already the law of Delaware. Second,
courts have found it quite simple to enforce the rule by giving expansive deference to the
substance of directorial decision-making, and no quarter at all for deviation from a purpose
to serve the shareholders.
60
Delaware’s LLC statute, in contrast, is organized under Chapter 18, under Title VI.
61
See infra, text accompanying notes __-__.
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statute, “A ‘public benefit corporation’ is a for-profit corporation . . . that is
intended to produce a public benefit . . . and to operate in a responsible and
sustainable manner.”62
The first section of the statute specifies that Public Benefit Corporations
are “subject in all respects” to the General Corporation Law, “except to the
extent this subchapter imposes additional or different requirements, in
which case such requirements shall apply.”63 And impose additional or
different requirements it does, in heaps. The PBC statute is strict and
allows very little private ordering. It contains many “shalls,” just a few
“mays,” and the phrase “unless otherwise specified in the certificate of
incorporation” is absent altogether.
Now, of particular importance to this inquiry is the final section of the
PBC statute, section 368, which is captioned “No effect on other
corporations.”64 It states: “This subchapter shall not affect a statute or rule
of law that is applicable to a corporation that is not a public benefit
corporation except as provided in § 363 of this title [which relates to
amendments to charters of existing firms].”65 So, facially this should mean
that if opting-out of shareholder primacy through private-ordering was
permitted prior to the PBC being passed, then that “rule of law” should be
unaffected by the PBC’s adoption. It is just that a privately-ordered multistakeholder firm cannot call itself a Public Benefit Corporation, because in
order to be a PBC you must comply with the PBC statute. Or, is a firm that
attempts to deviate from shareholder primacy in its own way now
condemned as an improperly-formed Public Benefit Corporation?66 We
must examine the extent to which section 368’s “no impact” assertion can

62

8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 362(a). The various states’ Benefit Corporation statutes are not
identical. Because my principle interest here is on the interrelationship between standard
corporate law and the Benefit Corporation, and since Delaware dominates in the standard
corporate law world, my focus here will be on the Delaware Public Benefit Corporation.
Given corporate lawyers’ affinity for Delaware, it seems likely that the Delaware Public
Benefit corporation will soon become the focus of the field. See Lyman Johnson,
Pluralism in Corporate Form, supra note __ at 270-271 (2013) (summarizing early history
of benefit corporation statutes).
63
8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 361 (emphasis added).
64
8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L.§ 368.
65
8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 366(c). The section and which will be discussed infra, text
accompanying notes __-__.
66
But see Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?, supra note __ at 555 (“[U]nder Delaware's
“doctrine of independent legal significance,” a court will not overturn a result that can be
accomplished one way because that result would have been prohibited if attempted in
another way”) (citing Rauch v. RCA Corp., 861 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1988)).
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indeed hold back an effort to view what is possible in the General
Corporation Law though the lens of what have been created with the Public
Benefit Corporation.
Consider first some of the mandatory terms of the public benefit
corporation. Section 362 of the statute specifies that “in the certificate of
incorporation, a public benefit corporation shall (i) Identify within its
statement of business or purpose pursuant to section 102(a)(3) of this title
one or more specific public benefits to be promoted by the corporation, and
(ii) state within its heading that it is a public benefit corporation.”67 This
helps vindicate the view, expressed above, that section 102(a)(3) is the
place to pursue multi-stakeholder governance). Section 362(b) defines
“public benefit”:
‘Public benefit’ means a positive effect (or reduction of negative
effects) on 1 or more categories of persons, entities, communities
or interests (other than stockholders in their capacities as
stockholders) including, but not limited to, effects of an artistic,
charitable, cultural, economic, educational, environmental,
literary, medical, religious, scientific or technological nature.68

The PBC includes several mandatory notice requirements. Section
362(c) requires that notice of the PBC status of the corporation be given to
anyone to whom shares in the firm are issued.69 Public Benefit
Corporations do not have to use the phrase “public benefit corporation” or
the abbreviation “PBC” in their corporate name, but if they do, then such
usage is sufficient to provide the notice.70 Additionally, Section 364

67

8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 362(a)(emphasis added). “Heading” is not a defined term in the
corporate code.
68
8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 362(b).
69
Curiously, no notice is required to be given to workers or consumers, who apparently are
assumed to either have no interest in the public benefit status of the firm, or else to
acquiesce in it by the cost of the public benefit being impounded into reduced wages for
workers or increased prices (or lower quality) for consumers. But this begs the question, if
labor and consumer markets are adequate to price the “public benefit” terms for workers
and consumers, making notice unnecessary, then why are the capital markets not adequate
to price it for equity investors? See David G. Yosifon, Towards a Firm-Based Theory of
Consumption, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 447 (2011) (assessing whether and why
consumers might prefer social benefit decisions to be made for them by directors at the
level of firm governance, rather than episodically through consumption decisions in the
market).
70
8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. §362 (no notice is required if the stock is registered with the SEC,
presumably under the assumption that registration would provide such notice). .
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requires the stock certificates of PBC’s to “note conspicuously that the
corporation is a public benefit corporation.”71
The statute also includes mandatory reporting requirements that, while
not draconian, might be undesirable for some firm promoters (because they
are costly). A PBC: “shall no less than biennially provide its stockholders
with a statement as to the corporation’s promotion of the . . . public benefits
identified in the certificate of incorporation and of the best interests of those
materially affected by the corporation's conduct.”72 The section includes
several additional “shalls” concerning what this reporting statement must
contain.73
Section 366(c) provides some expressly mutable elements, which are
not hugely important on their own (the charter may require the public
benefit report to be issued more frequently than biennially, it may require
that the report be made available to the public) but their very presence
serves to highlight the immutability of the rest of the benefit corporation
provisions.
Section 368’s promise that the public benefit corporation statute has “no
effect on other corporations” notwithstanding, is it now plausible to think
that a privately ordered multi-stakeholder corporation that does give actual
notice of its deviation from shareholder primacy, or note its deviant status
on its stock certificates, would be permissible? After all, there is no general
requirement that notice be given for charter-based departures from standard
default terms, for example for the adoption of staggered boards, imposition
of super-majorities for board elections and amendment adoptions, etc. It is
quite possible that Chancery would now say that the implied public policy
of the Delaware General Corporation Law is that deviation from
shareholder primacy has to be in the way prescribed by the PBC sections of
the statute. The notice requirement is not onerous or particularly restrictive
to what private-orderers might want to do, but other features of the PBC are
quite restrictive indeed.

71

8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 364.
8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. §366(b).
73
The report must contain “(1) The objectives the board of directors has established to
promote such . . . public benefits and interests; (2) The standards the board of directors has
adopted to measure the corporation’s progress in promoting . . . public benefits and
interests; (3) Objective factual information based on those standards regarding the
corporation’s success in meeting the objectives for promoting such . . . public benefits and
interests; and (4) An assessment of the corporation’s success in meeting the objectives and
promoting such . . . public benefits and interests.” 8 DEL. GEN CORP. L. § 366(b).
72
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For example, governance of the public benefit corporation is also
strictly prescribed by the PBC statute:
The board of directors shall manage . . . the business and affairs of
the public benefit corporation in a manner that balances the
pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of those
materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific
public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of
incorporation.74

This is a highly specific, rigid form of multi-stakeholder governance.
Again, no “unless otherwise provided in the articles” is offered. The
question we must ask (are asking) is whether this specificity is trivial, in the
sense that it can be avoided by private-ordering, or non-trivial in the sense
that it is the only way to deviate from shareholder primacy under Delaware
corporate law.75 One can easily imagine desirable alternatives, such as a
governance design that instructs the board to “pursue profits first and
foremost, but in a way that is not unduly disruptive of the legitimate
interests of nonshareholders.” Or, “pursue profits in a way that privileges
environmental sustainability over short-term profitmaking.” But the PBC
calls for only one model: directors are to “balance” shareholder interests
with the public benefits identified in the certificate. One scholar has
suggested that “balance” may be construed to mean giving equal weight to
each factor (otherwise, the thing would be unbalanced).76 Even if it were
not given such a literal meaning, this is still a specific and rigid governance
charge.

74

8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 365(a)(emphasis added).
Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?, supra note __ at 54 (arguing that mandatory rules are
“trivial” if they are “market mimicking, avoidable, changeable, or unimportant.”).
76
See Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note __ at 355 n. 64. Murray notes that
the Model Public Benefit Corporation Legislation crafted and promoted by the non-profit
group B Lab requires directors to “consider” both the shareholder and public benefit
interests described in the PBC charter, rather than “balance” them, as the Delaware public
benefit corporation statute prescribes. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301, available
at http://benefitcorp.net/attorneys/model-legislation). Murray reports that his telephone
conversations with members of the Delaware Corporation Committee that drafted that
state’s PBC legislation reveal different views among committee members as to what
“balance” means, and whether it is a more or less demanding standard than “consider.” Id.
This suggests either that the language in the statute was not carefully crafted, or else that it
was carefully crafted to be ambiguous. In any event, the legislative history of the provision
will not provide much guidance to a court confronted with construing it. See supra note __
and accompanying text (noting sparse legislative history bearing on the Delaware PBC).
75
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The statute also insists that the governance principles of a public benefit
corporation can only be meekly enforced. Section 365(b) states that a PBC
director:
shall not, by virtue of the public benefit provisions [in the charter]
. . . have any duty to any person on account of any interest of such
person in the public benefit or public benefits identified in the
certificate of incorporation . . . and, with respect to a decision
implicating the balance requirement in subsection (a) of this
section, will be deemed to satisfy such director’s fiduciary duties
to stockholders and the corporation if such director’s decision is
both informed and disinterested and not such that no person of
ordinary, sound judgment would approve.77

Non-shareholders have no duty owed to them and have no power to enforce
the charter’s “benefit” provisions. Only shareholders can enforce the
directors obligation to pursue the non-pecuniary benefit described in the
charter.78 It is therefore best to conceive of PBCs as “socially conscious
shareholder primacy” firms, rather than firms with multiple genuine
beneficiaries. PBC’s are still concerned only with the shareholder interest,
they simply conceive of the shareholder interest more expansively than the
pecuniary regard. But some people – investors, workers, consumers –
might desire to associate with a firm that allowed non-shareholders to
enforce real duties that were really owed to them. Could a firm achieve
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8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. §365(b) (emphasis added). Section 362(c) provides an
“exculpation” provision that is broader than that which is available under the General
Corporation Law. It states that the charter, “may include a provision that any disinterested
failure to satisfy this section shall not, for the purposes of § 102(b)(7) or § 145 of this title,
constitute an act or omission not in good faith, or a breach of the duty of loyalty.” 8 Del.
Gen. Corp. L. § 365. The language appears to allow opting out of liability for failures of
“oversight,” which the Delaware Supreme Court has said is a species of good faith, which
is a species of loyalty. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006) (“Where directors
fail to act in the face of a known duty to act . . . they breach their duty of loyalty by failing
to discharge that fiduciary obligation in good faith.”). Opting-out of liability for
disinterested bad faith failure of oversight is not permitted under the General Corporation
Law.
78
The PBC statute imposes substantially more onerous derivative standing requirements
for shareholders than those that govern derivative suits in ordinary corporations.
Shareholders of public benefit corporations can only sue derivatively if they own
“individually or collectively . . . at least 2% of the corporation’s outstanding shares or, in
the case of a corporation with shares listed on a national securities exchange, the lesser of
such percentage or shares of at least $2,000,000 in market value.” 8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. §
367. The Model Benefit Corporation Legislation calls for only shareholders to have default
standing to bring derivative actions by default, but allows firms to specify in the charter
that other stakeholders also have standing. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 305(c)(iv).
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such a design by forming a non-PBC firm with a charter provision
specifying that directors have an enforceable obligation to the nonshareholding interest specified in the charter? If such private-altering is
possible, then the Public Benefit Corporation was unnecessary. If the
Public Benefit Corporation was necessary to achieve any deviation from
shareholder primacy, or is now the only allowable alternative form, then
such private ordering is not possible.
Policymakers and commentators have described the Public Benefit
Corporation as adding flexibility to corporate law design.79 But it may
actually have reduced flexibility, making it more difficult to form socially
conscious enterprises, and restricting the ability of existing shareholder
primacy firms to adopt charter amendments committing themselves to
greater social responsibility. This may not have been the intent, but it may
end up being the result.
Statutory Interpretation
The crux of the interpretive problem here is whether the public benefit
corporation created merely a “menu option,” providing a specific type of
non-shareholder primacy governance corporation, or whether it is the first
and only type of non-shareholder governance that is permissible under the
Delaware General Corporation law. Where legislatures introduce “menu
options” to make salient that something is permissible under a statutory
scheme, they risk inviting an understanding that the menu-option was not
available until the legislature offered it, and risk a construction holding that
the menu option is the only thing of its sort that is permissible. By their
explicit authorization of some act, the law that predates the promulgation of
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See William H. Clark, Jr. & Larry Vranka, White Paper: The Need and Rationale for the
Benefit Corporation: Why It is the Legal Form that Best Addresses the Needs of Social
Entrepreneurs, Investors, and, Ultimately, the Public (Version of January 18, 2013)
(hereinafter, “White Paper) at 1 (“The benefit corporation is the most comprehensive yet
flexible legal entity devised to address the needs of entrepreneurs and investors and,
ultimately, the general public.”). See also William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson,
How Benefit Corporations are Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 Wm.
Mitchell L. Rev. 817 (2012) (formal publication of the White Paper). Certainly the public
statements by the Governor and others emphasized adding flexibility. At a press event
announcing the legislation, Delaware Governor Jack Markell said, “We’ve all heard about
corporations wanting to ‘do well’ while also ‘doing good.’ With this new law, Delaware
corporations will now have the ability to build those dual purposes into their governing
documents.” See “Governor Markell Signs Public Benefit Corporation Legislation,” July
17, 2013, available at http://news.delaware.gov/2013/07/17/governor-markell-signs-publicbenefit-corporation-legislation/ (quoting Markell).
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the menu option may subsequently be interpreted (or misinterpreted) as
having forbid the newly menu-ed option.80
Consider the introduction of the exculpation “menu option” of section
102(b)(7) into the Delaware corporate code in 1988.81 This section states
that the certificate “may” contain “a provision eliminating or limiting the
personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for
monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director.”82
Contemporary commentators tend to write and speak as if section 102(b)(7)
gave corporations the power to do something that was previously forbidden.
But that is far from clear. At the time it was passed, many scholars opined
that section 102(b)(7) was not necessary, because the power to exculpate
directors by charter provision was already implicit in the statute.83 Indeed,

80

See Michael Livingston, What’s Blue and White and Not Quite As Good As A Committee
Report: General Explanations and the Role of “Subsequent” Tax Legislative History, 11
AM. J. TAX POL’Y 91, 93-95 (1994) (“[E]vents taking place after enactment of a statute are
relevant to its interpretation. . . . [T]he legislature's action (or inaction) on a later measure
may suggest that it takes a particular view of existing law. . . . [T]hese statements are not
legislative history; but they may have a similar effect.”).
81
The statute was adopted in response to the shocking decision of Smith v. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), holding the directors of Tran Union, Inc. liable for breach of the
duty of care in connection with a profitable but rushed merger. Van Gorkom is today read
to have imposed a “process” obligation on directs before they can be given benefit of
expansive judicial deference to the substantive decisions under the business judgment rule.
82
The provision insists that “such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a
director: (i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its
stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of law.” 8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. §102(b)(7).
83
Norman Veasey, et. al., Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of
Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 BUS. LAW. 399, 403 (1987) (“The
concept of a provision in the certificate of incorporation limiting or eliminating the liability
of directors was not without precedent. Some scholars had suggested that the certificate of
incorporation of Delaware corporations could be amended to limit or eliminate liability of
directors without enabling legislation . . . . Indeed, some corporations had already adopted
such provisions.”). In 1990, Butler and Ribstein wrote:
There is a substantial debate among the Reporters for the A.L.I. project
as to whether statutory authorization is necessary to validate opt-out
provisions, with [John] Coffee supporting the section 7.17 approach of
validating opt-outs even in the absence of a charter provision, and the
Chief Reporter and Reporter for Part IV [Ribstein himself] insisting on
legislative authority.
Butler & Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties, supra note __ at 67. In a footnote, they
assert: “The provision is valid only if it merely clarifies an amendment power that existed
prior to enactment of the provision rather than enlarging the majority's power to amend the
contract.” Id. at 67 n. 300. See also PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at 139—43 (Tent. Draft
No. 9, 1989).
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while clearly not widespread, an example of jurists sanctioning an
exculpation clause privately-ordered into a corporate charter can be traced
to an English case from 191184 charging a rubber plantation’s directors with
a level of indifference in running the firm that would have made Mrs.
Prichard.85 The charter of the firm, however, contained a provision stating
that, “[n]o director . . . shall be liable . . . for any loss or damage occasioned
by any error of judgment or oversight . . . unless the same happen through
his own dishonesty.”86 The learned Judge Neville allowed it: “I do not
think that it is illegal for a company to engage its directors upon such terms.
I do not think, therefore, that an action by this company against its directors
for negligence, where no dishonesty was alleged, could have succeeded.”87
I have not found any cases in Delaware or elsewhere, where exculpation by
charter provision was disallowed prior to the promulgation of section
102(b)(7).
However, years after section 102(b)(7) was adopted, it has become
commonplace to read legal scholars writing as if the provision was an
innovation that allowed something that had been previously forbidden,
rather than as clarifying the existence of a power that was there all along.88
This re-framing was soon found also in the Delaware Supreme Court’s
own retrospective interpretation about what section 102(b)(7) did. In
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In re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates, Limited, 1 Ch. 425 (1911).
See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981) (holding a corporate
director liable for corporate looting undertaken by her children because “they spawned
their fraud in the backwater of her neglect”).
86
In re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates, Limited, 1 Ch. 425, 479-480.
87
In re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates, Limited, 1 Ch. 425, 480.
88
For example, after noting that LLC’s are free to exculpate professional advisors from
liability for aiding and abetting managerial breaches of fiduciary duty, Ann Conawy
laments that “[u]nder the current corporate scheme of the Delaware General Corporation
Law (DGCL), no such protection for advisors to a board of directors is available since
section 102(b)(7) only permits the elimination of personal accountability of a director to
the corporation or its stockholders for monetary liability for the fiduciary duty of care.”
Conaway, Lessons to Be Learned, supra note __ at 792. See also Marcel Kahan & Edward
B. Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Charter Provisions As
Precommitment, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 522 (2003) (“Sometimes, a new law or doctrine is
needed to clarify an ambiguity or to address a novel issue. At other times, the law may be
modified to expand the available choices. The adoption of title 8, section 102(b)(7) . . . falls
in the latter category.”); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate
Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1639 (2005) (“[S]tockholders
[can] reduce or eliminate director monetary liability for breaching the duty of due care.
Most states do not extend this protection to officers. Delaware, for example, does not.
Companies thus cannot by charter limit this exposure.”)(citing §102(b)(7)).
85

28

OPTING OUT OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY

Gantler v. Stephens, the Court for the first time explicitly held that officers
owe “identical” fiduciary duties to the shareholders, much as directors do.89
Immediately after announcing this, the Court dropped a footnote:
That does not mean, however, that the consequences of a fiduciary
breach by directors or officers, respectively, would necessarily be
the same. Under 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7), a corporation may adopt a
provision in its certificate of incorporation exculpating its directors
from monetary liability for an adjudicated breach of their duty of
care. Although legislatively possible, there currently is no
statutory provision authorizing comparable exculpation of
corporate officers.90

When section 102(b)(7) was passed there was at least a controversy as
to whether it was an innovation or merely a clarification (and the better
view was that it was a clarification). Years later, the interpretative
controversy about the genesis of the exculpatory provision is not even
referenced, and the revisionist view that the legislature had created
something new when it passed the provision is allowed to color the Court’s
conception of what is otherwise possible to accomplish under the statute.
After all, if section 102(b)(7) was merely clarifying what firms could
always have achieved through private-ordering, then by analogy the Gantler
court might have better noted that officers could be exculpated by charter
provision. A similar revisionism threatens to infect courts’ thinking about
the relationship between the PBC and the bounds of permissible private
ordering in the general corporation statute.91
There is little direct discussion in the academic literature about the
proper way to interpret whether menu options are suggestive or exclusive.
What has been written notes the issue, but does not suggest its resolution.92

89

Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 (Del. 2009).
Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 (Del. 2009).
91
Indeed, if a firm did adopt multi-stakeholder governance through a charter provision, as I
have urged is permissible, it is not clear under the Gantler dicta whether the charter could
also exculpate directors from duty of care liability to non-shareholding beneficiaries, since
§102(b)(7) only references exculpation as to duties owed to shareholders.
92
See, e.g., Daniel M. Häusermann, The Case Against Statutory Menus in Corporate Law,
9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 45, 76 n.8 (2012) (“Whether a statutory menu is open-ended or
closed-ended is a matter of statutory interpretation, to which the usual principles apply.”);
Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out, supra note __ at 2051 (“[L]ike restaurant menus, legal
menus might (in second-order fashion) indicate whether the menu options are exclusive-or, like most restaurant menus, a legal menu might be silent as to whether it is exclusive.”).
90
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Per Llewellyn, the familiar canons of statutory interpretation reflect rather
than resolve this analytic conundrum.93 The canon of expressio unius est
exclusion alterius, which stands for the proposition that the “expression of
one thing implies the exclusion of others”94 is possibly relevant.95 The
expression of permissible ordering of non-stakeholder governance through
the PBC implies that it cannot be accomplished otherwise in the General
Corporation Law, where multi-stakeholder governance is not mentioned.
However, as Scalia and Bryan note, “[v]irtually all the authorities who
discuss the negative-implication canon emphasize that it must be applied
with great caution, since its application depends so much on context.”96
And right on cue, a frequently cited case in Delaware opines that “the
Legislature does not necessarily admit that it did not by its prior enactment
embrace a particular case by an amendment directly applicable to such
case.”97
We might have recourse to legislative history, but the only formal
history indicates that the purpose of the bill was to entice more chartering
business to Delaware.98
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See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules a
Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950) (arguing
that for every familiar canon of statutory interpretation pointing the construction of a
statute in one direction, another canon can be found pointing it in the opposite direction).
The Delaware Supreme Court has adopted all of the usual canons of statutory
interpretation. The starting place is that unambiguous words are given exacting effect.
Where there is ambiguity, the statute is interpreted to effectuate the legislature’s intent.
Intent is gleaned from the overarching structure or purpose of the statute of which the
language is a part. Where such procedures are unavailing, recourse may be had to
legislative history. See generally Fraternal Order of Police, Delaware-Wilmington Lodge
No. 1 v. McLaughlin, 428 A.2d 1158, 1160 (Del. 1981) (summarizing Delaware
jurisprudence on statutory interpretation).
94
Scalia & Bryan, READING LAW, supra note __ at 107.
95
Scalia & Bryan, READING LAW, supra note __ at 107. One case discussed by Scalia and
Garner in their treatment of this canon includes language, albeit drawn from an area afield
from corporate law, which might apply to our question. The case involved a challenge to
the legitimacy of a state statute conferring on the governor the right to appoint temporary
superior-court judges, where the state constitution provided that superior court judges
“shall” be elected by both branches of the legislature. Id. at 107 (discussing State ex rel.
M’Cready v. Hunt, 2 Hill 1, 171 (S.C. Ct. App. 1834)). In applying the canon of expressio
unius, the Court struck down the statute, stating, rhetorically: “Does not the act of
prescribing the mode, necessarily imply a prohibition to all other modes?” Id.
96
Scalia & Bryan, READING LAW, supra note __ at 107.
97
See Kennedy v. Truss, Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County, 1 Terry 424, 13
A.2d 431 (1940).
98
DE LEGIS 122 (2013), 2013 DELAWARE LAWS CH. 122 (S.B. 47) (“Increasing interest in
public benefit corporations necessitates their inclusion in the Code. Committee Findings:
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The Delaware Corporation Law Council, a committee of the Delaware
Bar Association which has special responsibility for proposing and vetting
reforms to Delaware’s corporate law, was similarly indeterminate in the
guidance it gave on the purpose of the statue. When the Corporation Law
Council came forward in 2013 with its recommendation to adopt the PBC
statute, the Council promulgated a FAQ document on the issue.99 The last
question on the FAQ asks: “Couldn’t this same goal be achieved through
other types of entities?” The answer is evasive:
By using a Delaware corporation, entrepreneurs and investors who
wish to pursue these goals will be able to rely on the long tradition
of Delaware corporate law, as well as the Division of Corporations
and the Delaware Judiciary, to provide a measure of stability and
predictability in an area of law that may evolve rapidly.100

Another FAQ (indeed) was posed: “Can’t directors consider the interests of
non-stockholders already? Why is it necessary to adopt new legislation?”
The answer states:
While the DGCL provides broad authority for a corporation to
adopt specifically tailored provisions, that authority does not
provide a clear path to alter these fiduciary duties in an
enforceable manner.101

But this does not answer the pressing question: does the General
Corporation law not provide a clear path, or does it not provide a path?
The language and structure of the statute does not clearly imply that
private ordering of corporate beneficiary can now be accomplished only
through the means prescribed by the public benefit corporation.
Public Policy and Private Ordering

The committee found that allowing the creation of public benefit corporations in the State
would potentially benefit Delaware by creating incentives for new corporations to form instate.”).
99
“Delaware Public Benefit Corporations: FAQ” (on file with author). Curiously, while
the document was originally posted online, it appears to no longer be available online.
100
See, e.g., “Delaware Public Benefit Corporations: FAQ” (on file with author).
101
“Delaware Public Benefit Corporations: FAQ,” supra note __.
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The Sterling decision states that charter provisions may deviate for
common law corporate governance rules where they are neither contrary to
a public policy implicit “in the General Corporation Law itself,”102 or a
“public policy settled by the common law.”103 In the previous section I
argued that neither the language nor the structure of the Delaware corporate
clearly implies that the PBC is to be the exclusive, mandatory means of
deviating from shareholder primacy. Earlier I stated that there is nothing in
the longstanding common law of shareholder primacy to suggest that it is
immutable, and there is as yet no common law relating to the public benefit
corporation. However, as we struggles to understand whether the PBC
should be considered the exclusive means of departing from shareholder
primacy, let us here consider general public policy justifications for
mandatory, exclusive corporate law rules, and see if they may shed some
light on this case. This theoretical perspective may shed light on the
positive doctrinal assessment, and may aid assessment of what kind of
reforms are desirable, as policymakers confront the conundrum I have
surfaced here.
There are three basic justifications for having mandatory corporate law
rules. First, mandatory rules might protect vulnerable parties from
exploitation that might occur under a private-ordering regime. Second, and
mandatory rules might protect against the externalization of harms to thirdparties occasioned by other people’s private agreements. Third, mandatory
rules may induce efficient, socially desirable network effects that would not
be realized in a system that countenanced private-ordering. The trouble
with immutable corporate law rules is that they stifle autonomy and
innovation, threatening to leave us stuck with government designs that
might have been established in ignorance, or through rent-seeking.104 The
principles of a free society and the teachings of economics therefore
prescribe a presumption against mandatory rules, with the burden of
persuasion placed on advocates for them.
With respect to the exploitation justification, commentators have long
noted that the separation of ownership and control in corporate operations
creates a dynamic in which corporate directors can malinger or thieve at the
expensive of shareholders, who are too distant and rationally ignorant of

102

Sterling, 93 A.2d at 117.
Sterling, 93 A.2d at 117.
104
See Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporate Law, supra note __ at 1525.
103
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corporate affairs to stop it.105 Corporate law, and its crown jewel the
shareholder primacy norm, is designed to mitigate this agency problem.
Private alteration of corporate law’s prescribed terms threatens to
reintroduce opportunities for shareholder exploitation that the law seeks to
restrain. The rigid requirements of the public benefit corporation may be
designed to protect shareholders from corporate operations that would
otherwise waste or redistribute to other groups too much of what should go
to the stockholders. However, in writings undertaken without reference to
the beneficiary issue, the most influential mainstream corporate scholars
have doubted that private ordering of corporate governance standards really
can exploit shareholders. The capital markets are highly efficient, and
corporate governance terms that create greater risk of shareholder
exploitation are priced accordingly. Professional analysts scrutinize and
accurately price atypical terms in a corporate charter, and deviation from
shareholder-primacy will be subject to whatever discounts the market
deems appropriate. If firms want to exploit their shareholders with bad
charter rules, the firm’s costs of capital will be greater. Shareholders get
what they pay for, not more, and not less.106
These arguments are most believable in the context of large publicly
traded corporations where professional analysts actively scrutinize
governance terms.107 This argument may ironically suggest that privateordering of corporate terms is more acceptable in the context of large
publicly traded firms than in small, closely held firms, where unusual terms
105

See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 849 (1776) (“The directors . . . being
the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected
that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance which the partners in a
copartnery frequently watch over their own”); see also ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS,
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (seminal modern statement of
the agency problem).
106
See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Capital Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
107
Eisenberg makes that important observation that the argument that pro-management, or,
for our purposes, pro-worker or pro-consumer, terms are accurately priced through IPOs,
even if correct, is an argument about fairness, not efficiency. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, __ (1989). It is an argument
that shareholders got what they paid for, and are not being robbed, but it does not suggest
that such rules are desirable in terms of most effectively aggregating and deploying capital
in a scarce, and sometimes hungry, world. Eisenberg also notes that courts sometimes
refuse to enforce contract terms that upset the reasonable expectations of consumers even
where the terms demonstrably lowered the price to the consumer. The examples he gives
involve insurance contracts, which excluded conventionally covered items in homeowner
policies.
Eisenberg, Structure of Corporation Law, supra note __ at 1519.
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may be inaccurately priced or result in more onerous surprise as against
undiversified owners. One would usually assume that the small context
would be better suited to particularized bargaining, but where complicated
terms are at issue, the small context may call for uniformity or
immutability. Presently, most Public Benefit Corporations are small or
mid-sized ventures. There are, as yet, no publicly traded PBCs.108
Before a mandatory, exclusive deviation from shareholder primacy can
be justified out of fear of shareholder exploitation, we must consider that
exploitation is a widespread concern in corporate operations, and in some
ways, a zero-sum concern. Critics of prevailing corporate law have argued
that the shareholder primacy norm incentivizes firms to manipulate or
overreach when dealing with non-shareholders (for example, by skimping
on worker and consumer safety, product quality, or environmental impact)
in ways workers and consumers will find difficult to observe. Advocates of
shareholder primacy insist that such dynamics, which they admit are
predictable, should be restrained by operation of external government
regulation. However, the economic theory of regulation should lead us to
predict that firms will operate in the political sphere to stunt the
development of such regulations, or worse, turn them to their own use. The
Supreme Court’s opinion in Citizens United v. Federal Elections
Commission gives constitutional dimension to the failure of shareholder
primacy theory, as it holds that firms have a constitutional right to operate
in the political sphere.109 Some scholars claim such “bad contracts,” will be
priced-right in labor and consumer markets just as surely as bad corporate
governance terms will be. But then again, if labor or consumer markets are
bereft of the kinds of market-makers who routinely scrutinize charter terms
for capital, or if labor or consumer markets are small, as the market for a
small firm’s stock may be small, then such exploitative terms may not be
accurately priced for workers or consumers. Privately-ordered deviation
from shareholder primacy may make shareholders more vulnerable, but it
may make workers and consumers less vulnerable. Mandatory rules may
make shareholders less vulnerable, but it makes workers and consumers
more vulnerable. The flipability or indeterminacy of the exploitation point
should therefore counsel in favor of freedom to privately order corporate
beneficiary.

108

See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who's
Opting In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247-77 (2014).
109
588 U.S. 310 (2010).
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Assessment of the “externalities” justification for mandatory rules in
this context leads to a similar conclusion. There are good reasons to believe
that shareholder primacy has externality problems. It is hard to see that
such problems would be worse under a multi-stakeholder governance
regime. Therefore, if deviation from shareholder primacy seems likely to
mitigate externalization, then flexibility to adopt different governance goals
should be permitted, rather than deviation being permitted only though one
mandatory form.
The best theoretical argument for a mandatory, exclusive form of
opting-out of shareholder primacy in corporate governance may be a
“network effects” justification. Working outside of the question of
corporate beneficiary, Jeffery Gordon argued that mandatory corporate law
rules should be maintained where they constitute a public good, in the sense
that their repeated use, and repeated litigation about them, diminishes
uncertainty about the use of the standard form, and reduces the cost of using
the form.110 While allowing mutable terms may improve the situation of the
individuals who privately order, it may diminish overall social utility by
raising the costs to others of using the default form. Gordon also
highlighted the social costs borne in connection with litigation over
uncertain, privately-ordered deviations from standard forms. Deploying
these arguments in the present context, it may be said that allowing
deviation by private ordering of corporate beneficiary, or allowing tinkering
within the Public Benefit Corporation form, may result in fewer nonshareholder primacy firms than if the PBC were the only option. This may
be especially important where the charter is describing the relationship of
the firm to multiple stakeholders, for whom the capital markets cannot be
expected to vet peculiar charter terms.
Gordon’s “network effects” arguments were roundly dismissed by
strong advocates of private-ordering in corporate affairs. Butler and
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See Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, supra note __ at 1567-1569
(“Thus although firms collectively are better off if the standard form is maintained,
individual firms will have incentives to deviate from the standard from in a way that will
eventually undermine it.”). This is a version of a “lemons market” argument. In a lemons
market consumers find it difficult to distinguish good from bad products, and so prices tend
to settle along the mean, which causes sellers of higher quality products to leave the
market, which drives down average quality on offer. it could be that the mandatory Public
Benefit Corporation form is necessary to rescue benefit corporation forms from
proliferating to that point of introducing a “lemons problem.” See George Akerlof, The
Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488
(1970).
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Ribstein insisted that since standard terms have already acquired a high
level predictability, their utility would not be diminished by allowing
greater experimentation.111 This, of course, is not true in the public benefit
corporation area, where even the standard form has been relatively untested.
More relevant to the PBC context, Butler and Ribstein argued that the
network effects of a “standard” form would still be achieved if the form
were highly desirable and voluntarily used by numerous parties. They
conclude that “Gordon’s argument would stifle the most valuable form of
innovation—the evolution of new terms to replace a standard form that
would die if it were not mandated. . . . [M]andating terms on the basis of the
‘public good’ theory would impose significant social costs.”112 Gordon’s
social costs of litigation were also rejected by Bernie Black, who noted that
“the negative externality of costs borne by the state will be offset by the
positive externality of greater certainty to future users of the new term.”113
These critiques of the network justification for mandatory rules seems
applicable in the PBC context. If the PBC is a desirable form, it will be
used and its use will become ever cheaper over time as precedents make it
more predictable. Such network effects will not be unduly compromised by
allowing experimentation by those who prefer another approach.
It would seem that in addition to the statutory scheme itself not
implying that the public benefit corporation is the only permissible form of
deviation from shareholder primacy, broader public policies implicit in the
common law (and beyond) also do not clearly indicate that freedom to
private-order corporate beneficiary through corporate chartering should be
strictly regulated.
Actual Flexibility: Mid-stream Adoption of MultiStakeholder Governance
Suppose that it were permissible to privately order multi-stakeholder
governance in a corporate charter. Is it permissible to amend the charter of
an existing shareholder-primacy corporation to adopt multi-stakeholder
governance? In the Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Easterbrook and
Fischel insisted that the contractual nature of the firm should lead corporate
law to look suspiciously on “mid-stream” changes:
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Butler & Ribstein, Opting-Out of Fiduciary Duties, supra note __.
Butler & Ribstein, Opting-Out of Fiduciary Duties, supra note __ at __.
113
Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?, supra note __ at 578. Black adds: “And the state has
a simple remedy for any remaining net external cost: it can charge a higher price for
providing judges and courthouses.” Id.
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If the venture at its formation is designed in the ordinary fashion –
employees and debt investors holding right to fixed payoffs and
equity investors holding a residual claim to profits, which the
other participants promise to maximize – that is a binding promise.
If the firm suddenly acquires a newspaper and declares that it is no
longer interested in profit, the equity investors have a legitimate
complaint. It is a complaint for breach of contract, not for derogation
from some ideal of corporate governance.114

But their conclusion begs the question: have shareholders in firms with the
default shareholder primacy form of corporate governance entered into a
contract where that rule is immutable, or have they entered into a contract
where that rule can be altered?
Delaware provides that by default amendments can be adopted by a
majority of shareholders.115 The charter may specify a greater threshold,
but not a lower one. Section 242(a) of the Delaware corporate code states
that a corporate charter can be amended to include “such provisions as
would be lawful . . . in an original certificate of incorporation.”116 The
section states that “in particular, and without limitation on such general
power of amendment,” a charter may be amended so as “[t]o change . .
enlarge or diminish the nature of its business or its corporate powers and
purposes.”117 The amendment power is thus expansive; it contemplates that
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EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW, see supra n__.
See also, Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the Corporation,
55 BROOKLYN L. REV. 767, 768 (1989) (arguing that that Article 1, section 10 of the
United States Constitution, which states that “[n]o State . . . shall . . . pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligations of Contracts,” should be interpreted to forbid states from
fundamentally altering the governance rules of existing firms).
115
See 8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 242(b)(1), § 242(b)(4). Delaware’s statute also provides
that each class of stock that is effected by an amendment must approve the amendment by a
majority vote, even if the class of stock does not otherwise have voting rights. This rule is
immutable. 8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L § 242(b)(2). Historically, corporate charters could only
be amended through a unanimous vote of the shareholders. See Black, Is Corporate Law
Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis, 85 NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 542, 552
(1990) (exploring historical evolution of voting requirements for charter amendments).
This rule was incrementally eroded in the twentieth-century to the point where today most
statutes give the majority of shares the power the amend. While the majority-vote
threshold is mandatory, Black considers its mandatory nature “trivial,” since, “Public
choice theory suggests that submajority rule is likely to be inefficient, so there may have
been no demand for still more flexibility.” Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial, supra note __
at 552.
116
8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 242(a).
117
8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 242(a).
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the rights and financial interests of existing stockholders may be materially
diminished by amendment.118
Under Delaware’s code, only the board can initiate an amendment, and
they do so by “adopt[ing] a resolution setting forth the amendment
proposed, declaring its advisability, and . . . calling a special meeting of the
stockholders entitled to vote in respect thereof.”119 But if the default
corporate governance rule is shareholder primacy, as I insist that it is, then
there would seem to be no legitimate path through which a board could
initiate an amendment to deviate from shareholder primacy. Under the
shareholder primacy norm, the Board can only pursue an amendment that it
considers to be in the best interests of the shareholders, and not any other
group.
However, the Public Benefit Corporation statute does contemplate that
an ordinary Delaware corporation could amend its charter to become a
Public Benefit Corporation, and section 368 specifically states that such
amendment rules are applicable to already existing ordinary corporations.
Therefore, it is now permissible for an ordinary corporate board to advise
amending the corporate charter in order to deviate from shareholder
primacy. This truly is a new bit of flexibility introduced by the PBC.120
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There may be good reason to conclude that there are stronger public policy justifications
for holding common law rules unalterable through the amendment of charters of going
concerns, even if it would not have violated public policy to alter the same common law
rules in the initial charter. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder
Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 985 (1992) (citations omitted) (“[S]tate law
arguably does not permit corporate organic documents to redefine the directors’ fiduciary
duties. In general, a charter amendment may not derogate from common law rules if doing
so conflicts with some settled public policy. In light of the well-settled shareholder wealth
maximization policy, nonmonetary factors charter amendments therefore appear
vulnerable.”). Some analysts consider “midstream manager opportunism” to be a
particularly acute instance of shareholder vulnerability, counseling in favor of mandatory
rules in the mid-stream context that might legitimately be mutable at a firm’s launch.
Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?, supra note __ at 568 (“Managers of existing companies
are the principal political force behind many legislative changes, and they will lobby for
the power to avail themselves of the changes.”). But if you really believe in the power of
the IPO, supra text accompanying notes __-__ , then you should allow boards to alter all
rules mid-stream. Downstream opportunism was priced into the IPO.
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8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. §242(b)(1) (emphasis added).
120
8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. §368. The late Larry Ribstein, who passed away in 2011, would
undoubtedly have challenged this alteration as an unconstitutional interference with the
contractual rights of the shareholders. See Butler & Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the
Corporation, supra note __. The fact that the capital-markets evinced not the slightest
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When the Delaware Public Benefit Corporation statutes was first passed
in 2012, it required a 90 percent vote of every effected class of stock, even
if the stock was otherwise non-voting, before an ordinary firm could
become a public benefit corporation.121 But in 2015, the statute was
changed to allow an ordinary firm to become a Public Benefit Corporation
with only a two-thirds affirmative vote of the voting shares (rather than
each class of shares).122
Under the original version of the PBC statute, shareholders of ordinary
corporations who dissented from a vote to become a public benefit
corporations were entitled to appraisal rights. After the 2015 amendments,
appraisal rights are only available if the stock is not publicly traded.123
Interestingly, the statute states that if an ordinary corporation is being
merged into a “domestic or foreign public benefit corporation or similar
entity,”124 then dissenters are entitled to appraisal rights. This “similar
entity” verbiage may signal, or at least provide a statutory foothold for, the
idea that corporation deviation from the shareholder primacy might come in
many shapes and sizes, including privately ordered multi-stakeholder forms.
These rules would appear to control over a provision in the charter that
had stricter amendment standards. Suppose you have a corporation that
requires a 90 percent shareholder vote to amend the charter, which then
gains a 2/3 vote to become a public benefit corporation. The public benefit
corporation statute does not say that the 2/3 vote is required unless
otherwise provided in the non-PBC charter of the firm undertaking the
transformation. So in this sense, the PBC clearly reduces flexibility. Or
consider what effect there would be if a firm had a charter that stated that it
could become a PBC upon the vote of a simple majority of its shareholders.
Such a provision would apparently not control over the 2/3 percent that the
PBC requires.

shutter at the passage of the amendment provisions of the Delaware public benefit
corporation statute suggests either that the provision was not understood, or that they were
understood to be not very important, because they are highly unlikely to be used. See infra
text accompanying notes __-__ (critiquing the PBC statute for its triviality).
121
8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 363(a).
122
8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 363(a).
123
Appraisal rights entitle a dissenting shareholder to avoid being forced into a merger and
receive the fair market value of what their shares were worth before the merger. Dissenters
are not typically entitled to appraisal rights for charter amendments. 8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L.
§ 262 (1983). However, the corporation statute has always given appraisal rights where a
firm merged into a non-profit corporation See 8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 257, 262.
124
8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L § 363(a)-(c).
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Public Benefit Corporations may also disavow its public benefit status
with “approval of 2/3 of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to
vote.”125 Another question that the Public Benefit Corporation statute
proposes is whether or not there may be demand for any other kind of
voting requirement other than a 2/3 voting requirement for dropping benefit
status. If a corporation had privately-ordered into multi-stakeholder
governance, rather than using the PBC, then they could presumably drop
multi-stakeholder governance in favor of shareholder primacy (or consumer
primacy, etc.) by a majority vote of the shareholders, or through whatever
means of amendment were otherwise privately-ordered into the articles.
Menus Matter for Corporate Experimentation
If my view is correct, that it has all along been possible for promoters to
contract-to the public benefit corporation, the adoption of the statute may
nevertheless be significant. When the state showcases a “menu option,”
people are relieved of the burden of coming up with it themselves, and are
given assurances that this kind of ordering is in fact lawful. If it was clear
that the menu was merely one option, rather than an exclusive option, then
it could also stand as a foundation or starting point around which people
tinker or “hack” their own alterations.
A nice empirical study by Yair Listokin shows how menus can matter in
corporate law.126 Listokin analyzed a “natural experiment” that took place
through the proliferation of anti-takeover legislation in the 1980s. In a short
period of time, many states adopted rules relating to a relatively standard set
of anti-takeover measures, including “fair price,” “business combination,”
and “control share acquisition” rules.127 Different states, however, adopted
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8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 363(c).
Yair Listokin, What Do Corporate Default Rules and Menus Do? An Empirical
Examination, 6 J. of Empirical Legal Studies 279 (2009).
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“Fair price” rules authorize boards to impede structurally coercive tender offers where
the hostile bidder tries to pay less than a “fair price” for any outstanding shares. “Fair
price” is defined by one representative statute as the “maximum of ‘(1) the highest price
paid for the target company’s shares in the two years before the proposed acquisition was
announced; (2) the market value per share on the date the proposal was announced; (3) the
value determined in clause (2) multiplied by the highest price paid in the previous two
years divided by the market value o the common stock on the first date shares were
acquired in the two year period.’ §§ 33-840 to 33-842.” Listokin, supra note 286 n. 24.
“Business combination statutes” impose significant time delays on mergers between or
acquisitions by large shareholders of a firm and the firm itself, unless the incumbent board
of the target form approve the combination. Id. at 286-87. “Control share acquisition
statutes” impede large shareholders from exercising voting rights in their stock unless such
126
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different defaults. A majority of states adopted the antitakeover rules as
defaults, and explicitly authorized firms to opt-out by charter amendment.
Other states, however, passed legislation which explicitly authorized firms
to adopt anti-takeover rules, but did not establish such rules as a default.
Some states did not pass any anti-takeover legislation, but Listokin assumes
that privately-ordered anti-takeover rules would have been permissible in
such states (despite the absence of a statutory “menu option”). Finally, a
few states adopted mandatory anti-takeover rules.128
Listokin found that the default rules and menu options had significant
effects. For example, 98 percent of firms chartered in states with a “fair
price” default rule stuck with the default. In states with a fair price “menu
option,” fifty percent of firms opted into the “fair price” rule. In states with
no default or menu option, but where Listokin presumes “fair price” could
be privately prescribed, only 20 percent of firms had a “fair price” provision
in their charter.129
For present purposes, the important conclusion is that “menu options”
matter. Listokin argues that menu options “reduce transaction costs by
reducing the amount of drafting and negotiation required to adopt antitakeover protections. . . . Menus also create a focal point that engenders the
formation of a network effect, which also reduces transaction costs.”130
Listokin claims that these results “contradict the triviality hypothesis” and
that “[t]he failure of the triviality hypothesis suggests that legislatures
should continue to produce corporate law.”131
Another example of the power of menu options can be seen in
connection with the previously discussed exculpation provision of section
102(b)(7). After the provision was introduced into the Delaware corporate
code nearly every major firm adopted “exculpation” clauses in their
charters, rushing past the invitation to “limit” directorial liability into a full
embrace of “eliminate[ing]” it altogether. If opting-out of duty of care
liability was always available before section 102(b)(7), then why did so few

exercise is authorized by vote of the minority shareholders. Because of judicial acquiesce
to privately developed “poison pill” defenses, these rules are not very important today, and
many states that adopted them in the 1980s have abandoned them, but Listokin asserts that
they were regarded as important at the time. Listokin, What Do Corporate Default Rules
and Menus Do?, supra note __ at 288.
128
Listokin, What Do Corporate Default Rules and Menus Do?, supra note __ at 284-285.
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Listokin, What Do Corporate Default Rules and Menus Do?, supra note __ at 284-285.
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Listokin, What Do Corporate Default Rules and Menus Do?, supra note __ at 284-285.
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Listokin, What Do Corporate Default Rules and Menus Do?, supra note __ at 284-285.
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firms do so in their charters before the Delaware legislature put in on the
menu? Possibly, prior to the Smith v. Van Gorkom,132 corporate lawyers
did not think formal exculpation in the charter was necessary, because they
assumed that the “business judgments rule” was so expansive that directors
would never really be held liable for duty of care damages on any
imaginable set of facts. But given the ease with which exculpation can be
literally written into a charter, and that director’s stood only to gain if
court’s held such provision valid, and lost nothing if they were invalid, the
“they didn’t think they needed it” explanation for the infrequency of
privately-ordered exculpation before 1985 seems at least incomplete.133
Sometimes, it seems that it takes a long time for practitioners to realize
that an innovation is both permissible and desirable. Twenty-dollar bills,
apparently, sometimes lay around on sidewalks for decades before the state
points them out, and someone picks them up. The explicit statutory
invitation to completely exculpate directors from liability may have
signaled a wisdom or aided the development of a business and legal norm
that would not otherwise have existed.134 Thus, even if the Public Benefit
Corporation is merely a “menu option,” the state’s provision of such an
option may create a world in which there are more multi-stakeholder
governance corporations than would otherwise exist. Menus appear to be
important in this context: witness the emergence of many more nonshareholder primacy firms since the promulgation of the PBC “menu” then
existed before it.135
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See supra note __ (explicating the Van Gorkom holding).
The history of §102(b)(7) may also showcase an inversion of the view, championed by
Melvin Eisenberg, that the moral impulse that directors feel to on behalf of shareholders
are buttressed when those principles are reflected in law. See Eisenberg, The Structure of
Corporation Law, supra note __ at 1505. Where the law makes explicit the opportunity to
opt-out of care liability, the moral obligation to pay damages for one’s failure as a fiduciary
may diminish. The statutory imprimatur was a way for directors to signal to shareholders
that they were not just completely robbing the firm when offering a liability opt-out.
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Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, supra note __ at 1592 (“a change
that comes upon legislative invitation after public deliberation may give assurance of a
likely increase in shareholder wealth [or shall we say, in the PBC context, utility] that
eliminates any capital market penalty for the adopting firm.”).
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In part we must credit the work of social entrepreneurs, such as B-Lab, and even legal
scholars, for the work they have done promoting viability of the idea of business
corporations severing multiple stakeholders. See Brett McDonnell, Benefit Corporations
and Strategic Action Fields or (The Existential Failure of Delaware), 39 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. __ (2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2662532.
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IV.

PRESCRIPTIONS, NARROW AND BROAD
Narrow, Plausible Prescription: Seek Clarification

Corporate social responsibility activists urging state legislatures to adopt
Public Benefit Corporation statutes have insisted that these statutes are
necessary because of uncertainty regarding the viability of altering the
standard corporate form to achieve the multi-stakeholder governance they
insist investors, workers, and consumers desire.136 A better approach would
have been to petition the legislature for clarity on the point of private
ordering, rather than petitioning for an entirely new form that only more
deeply obscures the private ordering question. It is not too late to pursue
legislative clarification, perhaps with an amendment to the General
Corporation Law that specified: “nothing in this sub-chapter should be
interpreted to preclude a corporation other than a public benefit corporation
from specifying in its articles of incorporation that the corporation and its
directors owe obligations to non-shareholders or other public interests.”137
Along these lines, it is also time that Delaware give statutory imprimatur to
the common law rule of shareholder primacy, if this is indeed Delaware’s
preference, along with clear language that it is mutable.138 It would also be
desirable to alter the public benefit corporation statute to make it more
susceptible to private-ordering.
There is little risk not otherwise
encountered by investors, workers, or consumers, to providing greater and
genuine flexibility in the design of social enterprise.
Short of legislative reform, it also is still possible that in future litigation
that touches on corporate purpose of ordinary corporations, a jurist will
point the way, or throw down the gauntlet, with respect to mutability of
shareholder primacy. The current Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme
Court, Leo E. Strine, Jr., for example, has evinced significant interest in the
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See White Paper, supra note __ at 13 (“[T]he practical reality is that practitioners –
general counsel and outside counsel – are typically unwilling to recommend such a course
of action because the legal analysis is so unclear.”).
137
Before Delaware adopted its PBC statute, Ann Conaway urged Delaware to adopt
statutory language in its General Corporation Law expressing a policy of maximum
flexibility and contractual freedom, similar to the language that then existed (and still is
found) in the Delaware’s LLC statute. See Conaway, Lessons to Be Learned, supra note __
at 817-18.
138
The language of the California statute, supra note __, provides a good model. But see
infra, text accompanying notes __-__ (arguing that shareholder primacy should not be the
default corporate governance rule).
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subject of corporate purpose.139 This interest, combined with business and
legal developments, will undoubtedly result in important pronouncement on
these questions in the coming years. When the next Craigslist case comes
about, as it surely will in this era in which large firms are eager to cloak
themselves in the wool of social responsibility, and may forget the duties of
the shareholders’ shepherd, Chancery, or the Delaware Supreme Court,
should speak and clarify its views on whether, and how, shareholder
primacy in corporate governance can be altered.140
Aspirational Prescription: Change the Default Rule
If the impetus behind the Public Benefit Corporation is to provide a
vehicle through which holders of capital can invest in business corporations
that pursue profit in balance with other interests, then the statute satisfies
the charge.141 If, however, the motivation behind the Public Benefit
Corporation is to offer a cure to the legal and incentive structures that cause
shareholder primacy corporations to predictably operate in socially
irresponsible ways,142 then the PBC statute is entirely inadequate. It is not a
serious response to the problems engendered by shareholder primacy,
because capital clearly prefers the superior profits that are available in the
shareholder primacy firm, to the more “balanced” profits that are available
in a PBC. Even if the PBC’s do attract significant capital, it cannot be
expected that they will displace the socially deleterious effects of for-profit
corporations.143
If shareholder primacy in corporate governance is mandatory, then from
the shareholder perspective its mandatory nature is probably trivial, since
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See e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle With the Idea the For-Profit
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140
See supra note __ and accompanying text.
141
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this is the rule that capital would prefer in any event. But even if it is
mutable, this mutability is largely trivial to both shareholders and nonshareholders, but for different reasons. It is trivial to shareholders because
they do not want to change it, and it is trivial to non-shareholders because
they cannot plausibly change it. The default rule of corporate governance,
created by government, cannot plausibly be altered by widely dispersed,
cognitively limited, rationally ignorant workers and consumers.144 Firms
exist because transactions costs are high, so we cannot expect that it will be
easy for stakeholders to opt-out of the default rules that corporate law
provides.145
The Public Benefit Corporation “menu option,” in its present form,
therefore, is not a serious response to the problems associated with
shareholder primacy firms in our society. Indeed, it may make matters
worse by encouraging for-profit firms to behave more rapaciously on the
theory that benefit corporations are there for shareholders who want socially
responsible investing.146 It is more likely that ordinary corporations will be
content to blur the boundary, so as not to lose market-share to PBCs, while
the most rapacious kinds of companies will use it as an excuse not to even
pretend to worry about social responsibility. The Benefit Corporation
model also threatens to create a social policy “mirage” of responsiveness to
the problems attendant to shareholder-primacy firms. This mirage can help
legislators persuade themselves, and the public, that the law had responded
to the problem associated with corporations. In this sense, creating benefit
corporations is worse than doing nothing, because at least if nothing had
been done nobody could think that something significant had been done.
I have argued that the weakness of shareholder primacy theory counsels
in favor of a reform of corporate governance law to require corporate
directors to operate in the interests of multiple-stakeholders, including
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According to the Coase theorem, the state’s specification of legal entitlements, or
default rules, will not disrupt the efficient allocation of resources (or the efficient
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workers and consumers, rather than shareholders alone.147 An effective
multi-stakeholder corporate governance regime could only be established
by making it the default rule.148 And this could only be accomplished
through federal preemption of state chartering.149 Such preemption,
however, would not necessarily have to foreclose all experimentation or
private ordering in business design. Our policymaking choices are not so
stark. First, federal preemption might only apply to very large firms, with
small operations allowed the flexibility of state regimes. For the largest
corporations, we could require through federal legislation that boards at a
minimum understand that they are empowered to actively contemplate the
effect of corporate action on non-shareholders. Second, the federal multistakeholder governance standard might merely be a default rule, which
firms could opt-out of through a given set of procedures. Consideration of
the means through which a multi-stakeholder default could be avoided
opens up a wide array of possibilities, which might be deployed in different
contexts. As Ayers reminds us, in the area of defaults, policymakers are not
limited to deciding between mandatory or mutable rules, rather, once
having decided that a rule is mutable, another “lever” of policymaking is
presented in the question of how a default can be altered.150

V. Conclusion
Proponents of private-ordering must lay the intellectual groundwork
now to stunt the evolution of an idea that the only kind of multi-stakeholder
governance that is allowed in Delaware is that which is prescribed in the
PBC. The Delaware General Corporation Law supplies a default rule of
shareholder primacy in corporate governance. This rule should be
understood as alterable through private ordering in the corporate charter.
The emergence of the Public Benefit Corporation challenges but does not
upend this conclusion. The Public Benefit Corporation should be
understood as a “menu option,” which promoters may choose to pursue a
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Effectively operating Public Benefit Corporations can help provide evidence of the
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highly specific form of multi-stakeholder governance, but promoters remain
free to order “off the menu,” and get their own multi-stakeholder corporate
design. Delaware jurists or the Delaware legislature would be prudent to
explicitly sustain these conclusions through case law or statutory
clarification. The PBC itself should be reformed to make its key terms
default rules, subject to private-ordering.
A broader-reaching reform which may be pursued over the longer-term
would see the federal government overturning the shareholder primacy
governance default in favor of a multi-stakeholder presumption which could
only be altered through an amendment process that involved all corporate
stakeholders, and not just shareholders.
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